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Abstract
An increasing number of independent studies have con-
firmed the vulnerability of automatic speaker verification
(ASV) technology to spoofing. However, in comparison to that
involving other biometric modalities, spoofing and countermea-
sure research for ASV is still in its infancy. A current barrier to
progress is the lack of standards which impedes the comparison
of results generated by different researchers. The ASVspoof ini-
tiative aims to overcome this bottleneck through the provision
of standard corpora, protocols and metrics to support a common
evaluation. This paper introduces the first edition, summaries
the results and discusses directions for future challenges and re-
search.
Index Terms: Speaker verification, Spoofing, Anti-spoofing,
Countermeasure, Spoofing detection
1. Introduction
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) offers a low-cost and
flexible biometric solution to person authentication. While the
reliability of ASV systems is now considered sufficient to sup-
port mass-market adoption, there are concerns that the technol-
ogy is vulnerable to spoofing, also referred to as presentation at-
tacks. Spoofing refers to an attack whereby a fraudster attempts
to manipulate a biometric system by masquerading as another,
enrolled person. Acknowledged vulnerabilities include attacks
through impersonation, replay, speech synthesis and voice con-
version [1].
There are two general strategies to protect ASV systems
from spoofing: the first involves the continued pursuit of more
robust ASV technology in the general sense; the second, more
popular approach centres around the development of new spoof-
ing countermeasures. Countermeasures have been reported
for replay attacks [2, 3, 4, 5], speech synthesis [6, 7, 8, 9],
voice conversion [10, 11, 12, 13] and non-speech, artificial sig-
nals [14]. For a recent survey, the reader is referred to [1]. While
there are currently no alternatives, the use of non-standard
databases, protocols and metrics gives rise to two significant
problems: (i) a lack of support for comparable and reproducible
research, and (ii) countermeasures which lack generalisation.
The focus on highly specific spoofing attacks and the use
of non-standard databases often impedes the comparison of dif-
ferent results. For example, much of the work involving voice
conversion spoofing attacks was performed with NIST Speaker
Recognition Evaluation (SRE) datasets, often with different
voice conversion algorithms, protocols and metrics. The Wall
Street Journal (WSJ) datasets have been popular in work involv-
ing synthetic speech spoofing attacks, but again with a variety
of experimental configurations. As a result of database, pro-
tocol and metric diversity [15], comparisons between different
experimental results is extremely complicated, if not close to
meaningless.
Countermeasures which lack generalisation result from the
inappropriate use of prior information in their development.
The majority of existing countermeasures are optimised with
training data produced using exactly the same spoofing method
that is to be detected. This is clearly unrepresentative of the
real use case scenario in which it is impossible to know the
exact nature of a spoofing attack. At best, research results
generated with such methodologies exaggerate countermeasure
performance; at worst, they mask the true scale of the prob-
lem. Generalised countermeasures [16, 17] are needed to detect
previously unseen spoofing attacks, i.e. spoofing attacks in the
wild.
The ASVspoof challenge aims to encourage further
progress through (i) the collection and distribution of a standard
dataset with varying spoofing attacks implemented with multi-
ple, diverse algorithms and (ii) a series of competitive evalua-
tions. Following on from the special session in Spoofing and
Countermeasures for Automatic Speaker Verification [18] held
during the 2013 edition of INTERSPEECH in Lyon, France, the
first ASVspoof challenge [19]1 will be held during the 2015 edi-
tion of INTERSPEECH in Dresden, Germany. The challenge
has been designed to support, for the first time, independent
assessments of vulnerabilities to spoofing and of countermea-
sure performance. The initiative provides a level playing field
to facilitate the comparison of different spoofing countermea-
sures on a common dataset, with standard protocols and met-
rics. While preventing as much as possible the inappropriate
use of prior knowledge, the challenge also aims to stimulate the
development of generalised countermeasures with potential to
detect varying and unforeseen spoofing attacks.
In order to lower the cost of entry and to maximise partic-
ipation, the first ASVspoof challenge involved only the detec-
tion of spoofed speech. By decoupling spoofing detection from
ASV, expertise in the latter was not a prerequisite to partici-
pation. Participants were invited to develop spoofing detection
algorithms and to submit scores for a freely available, standard
dataset and protocol. The dataset was generated according to
a diverse mix of 10 different speech synthesis and voice con-
1http://www.spoofingchallenge.org
Table 1: Number of non-overlapping target speakers and ut-
terances in the training, development and evaluation sets. The
duration of each utterance is in the order of one to two seconds.
#Speakers #Utterances
Subset Male Female Genuine Spoofed
Training 10 15 3750 12625
Development 15 20 3497 49875
Evaluation 20 26 9404 184000
version spoofing algorithms. The particular spoofing algorithm
involved in any trial was not disclosed during the evaluation.
Performance was assessed by the organisers using a standard
metric described in the evaluation plan [19].
This paper describes the ASVspoof database, protocol and
metrics, all of which are now in the public domain. Also pre-
sented is a summary of 16 sets of participant results. Finally,
observations and findings are presented with priorities for the
future.
2. ASVspoof database and protocols
ASVspoof is based upon a standard database consisting of both
genuine and spoofed speech2. Genuine speech is recorded from
106 human speakers (45 male and 61 female) without any mod-
ification, and without significant channel or background noise
effects. Spoofed speech is modified from the original genuine
speech data by using a number of speech synthesis (SS) and
voice conversion (VC) algorithms. More details and protocols
to generate the spoofed speech can be found in [20]. The full
dataset is partitioned into three subsets, the first set for training,
the second for development and the third for evaluation. The
number of speakers and trials in each subset is illustrated in Ta-
ble 1. There is no speaker overlap across the three subsets.
2.1. Training data
The training set includes 3750 genuine and 12625 spoofed ut-
terances collected from 25 speakers (10 male, 25 female). As
illustrated in Table 2, each spoofed utterance is generated by
one of the five spoofing algorithms (S1 – S5) as follows:
• S1 - a simplified frame selection (FS) [21, 22] based
voice conversion algorithm, in which the converted
speech is generated by selecting target speech frames;
• S2 - the simplest voice conversion algorithm [23] which
adjusts only the first mel-cepstral coeffcient (C1) in order
to shift the slope of the source spectrum to the target;
• S3 - a speech synthesis algorithm implemented with the
hidden Markov model based speech synthesis system
(HTS3) using speaker adaptation techniques [24] and
only 20 adaptation utterances;
• S4 - the same algorithm as S3, but using 40 adaptation
utterances, and
• S5 - a voice conversion algorithm implemented with the
voice conversion toolkit and with the Festvox system4.
2http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/jyamagis/
page3/page58/page58.html
3http://hts.sp.nitech.ac.jp/
4http://www.festvox.org/
Table 2: Summary of spoofing algorithms implemented in
the challenge database. S1 to S5 are known attacks, ex-
amples of which are available for system development. S6
to S10 are unknown attacks seen only in the evaluation set.
Dev=Development; Eva=Evaluation.
#trials or #utterances Spoofing
Subset Train Dev Eva Vocoder algorithm
Genuine 3750 3497 9404 None None
S1 2525 9975 18400 STRAIGHT VC
S2 2525 9975 18400 STRAIGHT VC
S3 2525 9975 18400 STRAIGHT SS
S4 2525 9975 18400 STRAIGHT SS
S5 2525 9975 18400 MLSA VC
S6 0 0 18400 STRAIGHT VC
S7 0 0 18400 STRAIGHT VC
S8 0 0 18400 STRAIGHT VC
S9 0 0 18400 STRAIGHT VC
S10 0 0 18400 None SS
These five algorithms were chosen since they are among
the most easily implemented. They are referred to as known at-
tacks, examples of which are available for the training of spoof-
ing detectors. S1 and S2 are two of the most easily implemented
VC techniques. S3, S4 and S5 are all implemented with open-
source toolkits.
For S1, S2, S3 and S5, 20 utterances were used to train
the VC and SS algorithms. These utterances were included
in the larger adaptation set used to generate S4. As illus-
trated in Table 2, S1, S2, S3, and S4, all use the same
STRAIGHT vocoder [25] for synthesis, whereas S5 uses an
MLSA vocoder [23].
2.2. Development data
The development dataset includes both genuine and spoofed
speech from a subset of 35 speakers (15 male, 20 female). There
are 3497 genuine and 49875 spoofed trials. Spoofed speech is
generated according to one of the same five spoofing algorithms
used to generate the training dataset. All data in the develop-
ment dataset may be used for the design and optimisation of
spoofing detectors/countermeasures, for example, to tune clas-
sifier hyper-parameters. Spoofing algorithms used to create the
development dataset are a subset of those used to generate the
evaluation dataset. The aim is therefore to develop a counter-
measure which generalises well to spoofed data generated with
different spoofing algorithms.
All meta information, including speaker identities and exact
spoofing algorithms was provided to challenge participants for
both training and development sets. Participants were allowed
to use this information for system optimisation.
2.3. Evaluation data
The evaluation set is comprised of 9404 genuine and 184000
spoofed utterances collected from 46 speakers (20 male, 26 fe-
male). Recording conditions for genuine speech are exactly the
same as those for the training and development sets. However,
spoofed data are generated according to more diverse spoofing
algorithms. They include the same five algorithms used to gen-
erate the training and development sets and an additional five
spoofing algorithms, all referred to as unknown attacks:
• S6 - a VC algorithm based on joint density Gaussian
mixture models and maximum likelihood parameter gen-
eration considering global variance [26];
• S7 - a VC algorithm similar to S6, but using line spec-
trum pair (LSP) rather than mel-cepstral coeffecients for
spectrum representation;
• S8 - a tensor-based approach to VC [27] for which a
Japanese dataset was used to construct the speaker space;
• S9 - a VC algorithm which uses kernel-based partial least
square (KPLS) to implement a non-linear transformation
function [28] (without dynamic information, for simpli-
fication), and
• S10 - an SS algorithm implemented with the open-source
MARY Text-To-Speech system (MaryTTS)5.
S6, S7, S8 and S9 all use 20 utterances to train the con-
version function. This is the same training data used for S1,
S2, S3 and S5. The speech synthesis system of S10 is trained
with 40 utterances per speaker. Since the evaluation set contains
spoofing attacks not seen in the development set, it is more rep-
resentative of the practice scenario (in which there is always the
potential for previously unseen attacks). Corresponding results
will therefore shed light into the potential for countermeasures
‘in the wild’, i.e. performance in the face of previously unseen
attacks. Participants were requested to submit spoofing detec-
tion scores on this set for which no meta information was pro-
vided.
3. Motivation: degraded ASV performance
under spoofing attacks
In order to confirm vulnerabilities to spoofing, experiments
were conducted using the challenge database and a state-of-the-
art Probabilistic Linear Discriminant Analysis (PLDA) [29, 30]
ASV system. Five utterances from each target speaker were
used as enrolment data. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ0, WSJ1
and WSJCAM) and Resource Management (RM1) databases
were used to train the Universal Background Model (UBM) and
eigenspaces. More details of the PLDA system can be found
in [20].
ASV results for the evaluation set are presented in Table 3.
Results are illustrated for the baseline and for the same system
when subjected separately to each of the 10 spoofing attacks.
The baseline Equal Error Rate (EER) is 0.42%; the database
is clean without any channel or noise effects. Performance
degrades significantly when subjected to each spoofing attack.
The lowest EER is 0.87% (S2). The highest is 45.79% (S10).
These results confirm vulnerabilities to spoofing and demon-
strate the importance of developing countermeasures.
4. Protocol, metric and results
4.1. Protocol
ASVspoof 2015 focuses on a stand-alone spoofing detection
task. The challenge database is accompanied with a standard
protocol. It comprises a list of trials, each corresponding to
a randomly named audio file. Participants should assign to
each trial a real-valued, finite score which reflects the relative
strength of two competing hypotheses, namely that the trial
is genuine or spoofed speech. For compatibility with NIST
speaker recognition evaluations, we assume that the positive
5http://mary.dfki.de/
Table 3: PLDA ASV system performance. Results illustrated
for the baseline and the same system when subjected to spoofing
(S1-S10). EER=Equal Error Rate.
Spoofing algorithm EER (%)
Baseline 0.42
S1 32.92
S2 0.87
S3 25.42
S4 28.44
S5 35.92
S6 33.76
S7 29.71
S8 30.63
S9 29.50
S10 45.79
Average(S1-S10) 29.30
class represents the ‘non-hostile’ class, i.e. genuine speech.
High detection scores are thus assumed to indicate genuine
speech whereas low scores are assumed to indicate spoofed
speech.
4.2. Metric
Participants were not required to optimise a decision threshold,
and thus neither to produce hard decisions; the primary metric
for ASVspoof 2015 is the ‘threshold-free’ EER. For the spoof-
ing detection task the EER is defined as follows. Let Pfa(θ) and
Pmiss(θ) denote the false alarm and miss rates at threshold θ:
Pfa(θ) =
#{spoofed trials with score > θ}
#{total spoofed trials} ,
Pmiss(θ) =
#{genuine trials with score ≤ θ}
#{total genuine trials} ,
so that Pfa(θ) and Pmiss(θ) are, respectively, monotonically de-
creasing and increasing functions of θ. The EER corresponds
to the threshold θEER at which the two detection error rates are
equal i.e. EER = Pfa(θEER) = Pmiss(θEER). EERs were
estimated using the Bosaris toolkit6. While the EER was deter-
mined independently for each spoofing algorithm, the average
EER for the full evaluation dataset was used for ranking sub-
mission results.
4.3. Results
Participants were able to submit scores for up to six systems.
One of these systems was designated as the primary submission.
Spoofing detectors for all primary submissions were trained us-
ing only the training data in the ASVspoof 2015 corpus. The
dataset was requested by 28 teams from 16 countries; 16 teams
returned primary submissions by the deadline. A total of 27
additional submissions were also received. Anonymous results
were subsequently returned to each team who were then invited
to submit their work to the ASVspoof special session for IN-
TERSPEECH 2015.
This paper summarises the challenge results for primary
submissions only. EER results are illustrated in Table 4 in
which each line represents the submission of each team. Results
are shown independently for known attacks (S1-S5), unknown
6https://sites.google.com/site/
bosaristoolkit/
Table 4: Summary of primary submission results in the
ASVspoof 2015 challenge.
Equal Error Rates (EERs)
System ID Known attacks Unknown attacks Average
A 0.408 2.013 1.211
B 0.008 3.922 1.965
C 0.058 4.998 2.528
D 0.003 5.231 2.617
E 0.041 5.347 2.694
F 0.358 6.078 3.218
G 0.405 6.247 3.326
H 0.670 6.041 3.355
I 0.005 7.447 3.726
J 0.025 8.168 4.097
K 0.210 8.883 4.547
L 0.412 13.026 6.719
M 8.528 20.253 14.391
N 7.874 21.262 14.568
O 17.723 19.929 18.826
P 21.206 21.831 21.518
Average 3.337 9.294 6.316
(STD: 6.782) (STD: 6.861) (STD: 6.558)
attacks (S6-S10) and the average, ranked according to the lat-
ter. Almost all submissions achieved excellent performance for
known attacks (for which training data was provided). EERs
in the case of unknown attacks are significantly and universally
higher. The lowest EER for all attacks is 1.211%, whereas those
for known and unknown attacks are 0.003% and 2.013%, re-
spectively. The lowest EER for unknown attacks (2.013%) is
671 times higher than that for known attacks (0.003%).
These results illustrate the potential of over-fitting coun-
termeasures to known attacks which may leave ASV systems
prone to unforeseen spoofing attacks. For example, while sys-
tem D achieves a lower EER than system A in the case of known
attacks (0.003% vs 0.408%), the EER for system D is over twice
that of system A in the case of unknown attacks (5.231% vs
2.013%). In turn these results thus confirm the importance of
developing more generalised countermeasures and also the need
for further work and future evaluations.
5. Discussion and future work
Discussed here are some of the limitations of the ASVspoof
challenge and priorities for future research. One limitation re-
gards the inclusion of only high-technology speech synthesis
and voice conversion spoofing algorithms. While their relative
severity is currently uncertain, low-technology replay and im-
personation attacks were not considered. Even if these alterna-
tive attacks prove to be less severe than speech synthesis and
voice conversion, they might well be the most common in prac-
tice; their implementation requires no particular expertise, nor
equipment. There is thus some cause to include such attacks in
future ASVspoof challenges.
The second limitation relates to the focus on STRAIGHT
vocoders. Other types of vocoder, such as sinusoidal
vocoders [31] are also popular and their use may have different
impacts on spoofing. Accordingly, a greater variety of vocoders
and potentially more advanced spoofing algorithms should be
considered in future challenges.
The lack of any additive noise or channel effects may also
be a limitation. Even if their omission for the first evaluation
was a deliberate choice, their effect on spoofing and spoofing
detection is currently uncertain. It will thus be important to
address additive noise and channel variability in the future.
Future evaluations should also measure the impact of spoof-
ing and detection on ASV. While such work has already been
reported, in many cases it considered spoofing attacks imple-
mented with full knowledge of the ASV system. Future evalua-
tions should thus address the integration issue.
It is also stressed that the evaluation was not intended, nor
sufficient to compare the relative severity of different spoofing
attacks; different levels of effort have been dedicated to devel-
oping speech synthesis and voice conversion attacks and differ-
ent quantities of training data were used in their implementa-
tions. A meaningful comparison between the severity of each
attack should be a priority for the future. In addition, closer col-
laboration with the speech synthesis and voice conversion com-
munities should be considered in order that future evaluations
include the very best algorithms.
Finally, the focus on text-independent ASV is perhaps not
the most representative of authentication applications in which
spoofing is relevant. Future evaluations should therefore in-
clude an emphasis on text-dependent ASV. The organisers are
currently working in this direction.
6. Conclusions
The first automatic speaker verification spoofing and counter-
measures challenge (ASVspoof 2015) was highly successful in
attracting significant participation. This paper presents the chal-
lenge database, organisation, evaluation results, and priorities
for future challenges and research.
Even though the best results show an overall average de-
tection EER of less than 1.5%, the EER of unknown attacks is
five times greater than that of known attacks. In addition, while
some attacks are easily and consistently detected, others (e.g.
S10) provoke extremely high error rates nearing 50%. The low
overall average is not necessarily the best indicator of ASV ro-
bustness especially if, as is likely, fraudsters concentrate on the
most successful spoofing attacks. Accordingly, the error rates
for the most effective spoofing attacks are perhaps more rep-
resentative than the average error rates. In any case, even if
average detection EERs are low, it is the resulting degradation
in automatic speaker verification performance which is of the
greatest importance; these degradations are often much greater.
The overriding findings from ASVspoof 2015 show the re-
maining need to develop more generalised spoofing detection
algorithms. Generalisation will remain a focus for future eval-
uations, as will the integration of spoofing detection with auto-
matic speaker verification and text-dependent scenarios.
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